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Norms and normative multiagent systems have become the subjects of interest for many researchers. Such interest is caused by the
need for agents to exploit the norms in enhancing their performance in a community. The term norm is used to characterize
the behaviours of community members. The concept of normative multiagent systems is used to facilitate collaboration and
coordination among social groups of agents. Many researches have been conducted on norms that investigate the fundamental
concepts, definitions, classification, and types of norms and normative multiagent systems including normative architectures
and normative processes. However, very few researches have been found to comprehensively study and analyze the literature in
advancing the current state of norms and normative multiagent systems. Consequently, this paper attempts to present the current
state of research on norms and normative multiagent systems and propose a norm’s life cycle model based on the review of the
literature. Subsequently, this paper highlights the significant areas for future work.
1. Introduction
The term social norms is used to define the behaviors
of society members. Social norms as defined by Cialdini
and Trost [1] are “rules and standards that are understood
by members of a group and that guide and/or constrain
social behavior without the force of laws.” According to
Melnyk [2], these rules and standards entail the expected
value of others that can be identified by observing their
behaviors. Basically, social norms are informal rules and
standards which are socially shared and comparative stable
guides of society members’ behaviors. However, the informal
and nonobligatory character implies the presence of social
reinforcements, such as agreement or disagreement, and
discriminate social norms from laws [2].
Norms usually direct the option of behaviors in human
communities. Conformity to norms reduces social frictions
and facilitates coordination [3]. Norms manage a variety of
phenomena, involving “property rights, contracts, bargains,
forms of communication, and concepts of justice,” and regu-
late a uniform behavior within a social group but often differ
substantially among groups [4]. Over time, norms changes
could happen, due to objective circumstances or changes in
subjective perceptions and expectations [4].
The objectives of this paper are (i) to review and discover
the current state of norms architecture and the normative
processes, (ii) to propose a norm’s life cycle model based
on the current state of norms research, and (iii) to propose
potential future work in norms and normative multiagent
research. Our contribution in this paper is threefold. Firstly,
it proposes norms taxonomy. Secondly, it defines a new type
of regulative norms and thirdly, it proposes a norm’s life cycle
model.
The next section reviews the literature on social norms,
specifically, in the definition of norms in social science and
multiagent systems. It first presents the two main norms
classification as proposed by the literature, which are con-
ventional and essential norms. Subsequently, it discusses
several norms characteristics such as concepts, definitions,
types, and finally the norms’ life cycle. This is followed by
a comprehensive review of normative multiagent systems in
Section 3.
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Section 4 presents a comprehensive review of the empir-
ical studies in normative systems such as norm creation,
enforcement, spreading, emergence, detection, and assimila-
tion and their simulation mechanisms. Having presented the
different empirical studies on normative systems, Section 5
reviews the models in the literature on norm’s life cycle.
From the review, we discuss the limitation of each model,
based on which we develop our own norm’s life cycle model
which extends and augments the findings of existing models.
Section 6 presents suggested future work and Section 7 con-
cludes the paper.
2. Social Norms
2.1. The Concept of Norms. Norms (in this paper, norms
and social norms have the same meaning) are informal
rules that are socially enforced. However, a norm represents
the expected behavior towards a specific situation [5]. The
concepts of norms are used to determine the behaviors of
agents within a community and are commonly accepted
as efficient means to normalize their behaviors [6]. Norms
represent desirable behaviors for a population of a natural
or artificial community and they are generally understood
as rules indicating actions that are expected to be pursued
that are either obligatory, prohibitive, or permissive based on
a specific set of facts. According to Hollander and Wu [7],
norms have been used to indicate constraints on behavior
[8], to create solutions to a macrolevel problem [9], and to
serve as obligatory [10], regulatory, or control devices for
decentralized systems [11].
Anderson and Taylor [12] categorize norms into three
main kinds:
(i) folkways: they are not substantially important norms
and only mildly enforced in a society, that is, right
manners, suitable dress, and proper eating behavior;
(ii) mores: they are the important norms of a society;
mores violation evokes strict punishment (against
the law most of the time), for example, incest and
cannibalism;
(iii) laws: the type of norms which are designed, main-
tained, and enforced by the political authority of a
society, for example, speeding, cheating on income
tax, and murder.
The literature has presented ample definitions of norms
[13]. Hexmoor et al. [14] suggested that “a norm has different
definitions in different areas of study such as social science,
game theory, psychology, and legal theory.” The Webster’s
Dictionary (http://www.webster.com/) defines a norm as [15]
(i) an authoritative standard;
(ii) a principle of right action binding upon the members
of a group and serving to guide, control, or regulate
proper and acceptable behavior;
(iii) generally as
(a) a set standard of development or achievement
normally derived from the average or median
achievement of a large group;
(b) a pattern or trait taken to be typical in the
behavior of a social group;
(c) an extensively practiced procedure or custom.
These definitions represent the term of norm in different
disciplines of normative research such as sociology, psychol-
ogy, philosophy, deontic logic, legal theory, decision theory,
and game theory [15]. Based on Verhagen [15] and Hollander
and Wu [7], we set out the following definitions.
(i) In sociology and social theories, norms are rules or
constraints of behavior that are socially enforced and
considered valid by the majority of a social group
[4, 13, 16–18]. Tuomela [19] distinguished different
kinds of norms which are rules (r-norms), social
norms (s-norms), moral norms (m-norms), and pru-
dential norms (p-norms). Rules (r-norms) depend on
agreement of authority (e.g., taxes have to be paid by
all), social norms depend on mere mutual belief (e.g.,
people should not spit), and moral norms appeal to
one’s conscience (e.g., one should not steal or cheat).
Prudential norms are based on rationality (e.g., one
has to maximize one’s expected utility) [20].
(ii) In deontic logic, norms are represented as obligations
or permissions that an individual has to a larger social
system [21]. Obligation can be in an opposite form, in
which situation it is indicated as prohibition [7].
(iii) In legal theory, norms are any rules of behavior
imposed by an authorized body and enforced via
applying sanctions [10].
(iv) In decision theory, game theory, and any other theory
that depends on rational actors handling norms in
a similar way, a behavior that has been adopted by
the majority of a social group is considered successful
[16].
The website, http://changingminds.org/ (2008), defines
norms as behavioral rules that are used for suitable and
unsuitable values, beliefs, and attitudes in a social group.
Savarimuthu et al. [22] define norms as expected behaviors
by the members of a specific society.
2.2. Fundamental Norms. The fundamental norms are driven
by injunctive norms, which refer to people’s beliefs about
what have to be done [23] and descriptive norms, which
refer to beliefs about what is really done by the majority in
one’s social group [24].This could be exemplified by a formal
meeting, in which a majority of the attendees are silent and
attentive (descriptive norms), so much so that others act in
a similar manner fearing the incurrence of social sanctions
such as frowning or giving silent gestures if they do not
comply (injunctive norms) [24].
Melnyk [2] argued that descriptive norms (what a major-
ity of population does) influence behavior directly, while
injunctive norms (what the population approve) could acti-
vate attitudes. They support their argument with results that
show that
(i) descriptive norms possess a stronger influence on
behavior than injunctive norms;
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(ii) descriptive norms possess a weaker influence on
attitudes than injunctive norms.
2.3. Norms Classification. In the literature of normative mul-
tiagent systems, several terms have been used to present the
concept of norms, which are conventions, social norm, and
social law [25]. Coleman [26] defined two main categories
of norms: conventions and essential norms. Correspondingly,
Villatoro [25] grounded the difference between conventions
and essential norms.
Conventions. Conventions are natural norms that emerge
without any enforcement [25]. Conventions solve coordi-
nation problems when there is no conflict between the
individual and the collective interests; for example, everyone
conforms to desired behavior [25]. Young [27] defined con-
ventions as “a pattern of behavior that is customary, expected,
and self-enforcing. Everyone conforms, everyone expects
others to conform, and everyone wants to conform given that
everyone else conforms.” Conventions fix one norm amongst
a set of norms which is always efficient as long as each one
in the community employs the same norm, that is, greetings,
driving side of the road [25].
Essential Norms. Essential norms solve or ease collective
action problems when there is a conflict between an indi-
vidual and the collective interests [25, 28]. For example, “the
normnot to pollute urban streets is essential in that it requires
individuals to transport their trash, rather than dispose of it
on the spot, an act that benefits everyone” [29].
The literature of normative multiagent systems suggests
three kinds of norms [30]. The first kind is regulative norms,
which specify the ideal and varying degrees of subideal
behavior of a system by means of obligations, prohibitions,
and permissions [30]. The second kind is constitutive norms,
which normalize the creation of institutional norms, in addi-
tion to the revision of the normative system itself [31]. The
third kind is the procedural norms, which are instrumental
norms addressed to agents acting on roles in the normative
system intending to perform the social order, particularly in
terms of substantive norms [32].
Regulative Norms. Regulative norms are intended for reg-
ulating activities by imposing obligation or prohibition in
performing an action [33]. As Peczenik [34] commented,
a regulative norm qualifies an action or a state of affairs
as prescribed, permitted, or prohibited. Because regulative
norm qualifies an action, it can be treated as a norm of
conduct, for example, the responsibility to lodge a police
report without a reasonable delay upon finding lost or stolen
things. A norm of conduct can prescribe punishment or a
sanction for a person who violates a norm. One can thus
make a distinction between a sanctioned and sanctioning
norm. Peczenik [34] also described moral norms that serve
goal norms, for example, the guarantee that “everybody ought
to have a decent standard of living.” In other accounts,
regulative norms produce regulation of an earlier problematic
situation by setting rules for actors’ behavior, which represent
obligation and prohibitions [35], for example, the rule that a
person “should drive on the right lane” [33].
Constitutive Norms. Constitutive norms are affirmed to pro-
duce new goal norms or states of affairs, for example, the
rules of a game like chess [33]. Boella and van der Torre [36]
observed numerous features of constitutive norms; one of
them is an intermediate concept exemplified by a statement,
for example, “this is a presiding official in a wedding cere-
mony” or “this bit of paper counts as a five-euro bill” [36].
Two other features are organizational and structural norms,
which refer to how roles define power and responsibilities
and how hierarchies structure groups and individuals [30].
Norms are introduced by both the agents who play legislative
roles as well as ordinary agents who create new obligations,
prohibitions, and permissions concerning specific agents [31].
Boella and van der Torre [36] differentiated regulative norms
and constitutive norms with an example; for instance, if the
regulative norm states that vehicles are forbidden in the park,
then the constitutive norm is that “bicycles are also counted
as vehicles in the park.”
Procedural Norms. Procedural norms are categorized as
objective and subjective. Objective procedural norms rep-
resent the rules that express how decisions are really made
in a normative system, while subjective procedural norms
represent the instrument for individuals working in a system,
for instance, back-office procedures [37].
2.4. Norm Life Cycle. The literature on social norms reveals
that there is no unified view on the mechanism of norms
creation and spreading in a society or social group [38–40].
However, according to Coleman [41], “norms are macrolevel
constructs based on purposive actions at the microlevel
but coming into an existence through a micro-to-macro
transition. Once in existence, they lead, under certain con-
ditions, to actions of individuals (i.e., sanctions or threat of
sanctions) which affect the utilities and thus the actions of
the individuals to whom the sanctions have been or might be
applied.”
3. Normative Multiagent Systems (Normas)
Boella et al. [42] claimed that researchers of moral and legal
philosophy have studied traditional normative systems [43].
Such systems have been integrated with multiagent systems
when numerous models on multiagent systems have been
investigated that include norms in agent architectures [44–
46].
According to Savarimuthu [40], norms inmultiagent sys-
tems research can be traced back two decades ago [8, 47–50].
Normative multiagent systems are combination of two estab-
lished fields which are normative systems and multiagent
systems [42].They are represented by sociological theories in
multiagent systems applications and by the relation of agent
theory and the social sciences such as sociology, philosophy,
economics, and legal science [36].The concepts of normative
multiagent systems are used to facilitate cooperation and
coordination among social group [8, 51, 52].
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Jones and Carmo [53] defined a normative multiagent
system as “sets of agents (human or software) whose inter-
actions can be regarded as norm-governed, whereby the
norms prescribe how the agents should and should not ideally
behave.” Boella and van der Torre [32] defined normative
multiagent system as “a multi-agent system organized by
means of mechanisms to represent, communicate, distribute,
detect, create, modify, and enforce norms, and to deliberate
about norms and detect norm violation and fulfillment.”
Researches in NorMas have proceeded widely and
ardently within this decade [5]. Some suggested concepts
by researchers involved attribution on mental attitudes to
normative systems [54]; defining the role of a defender agent
to achieve the task of detecting violations and sanctioning
them on behalf of a normative system [31]; obligation and
permission [55]; formalizing the triaspolitica using the stan-
dard BDICTL logic for agent verification [56]; regulative
and constitutive norms [31]; substantive and procedural
norms [32]; norm implementation [57]; and a verification
framework for normative multi-agent systems [58]. Other
researchers focus on norms construction in institution and
formalizing relationship between norm and agent’s behavior
[59] and providing a specification of the desired overall
normative system behavior [60].
3.1. State of the Art in Normative Systems. In the architecture
of normative multiagent systems, the literature offers ample
research information on normative systems. We present here
several frameworks and their description.
BOID Normative Architecture. Broersen et al. [44] proposed
the belief, obligation, intention, and desire (BOID) archi-
tecture, which is the BDI architecture with an obligation
component, O. It has feedback loops to consider all effects
of actions before committing to them and mechanisms
to resolve the output conflicts of its components. BOID
determines logical criteria to retract the attitudes of agent
with the changing environment and to resolve conflicts by
stating different general policies according to the considered
agent type. Agent types conform to such ways by which
conflicts are identified and settled. A realistic agent thus
corresponds to a conflict-resolution type in which beliefs
override all other factors, while other agent types, such as
simple-minded, selfish, or social ones, adopt different orders
of overruling.
Programming BOID-Plan Agents. Dastani and van der Torre
[61] introduce an abstract and operational semantics of an
agent programming language which is used to implement
cognitive agents. They modeled the mental attitudes which
are represented by rules based on the BOID architecture.
By monitoring the environment, the agent can generate
goal sets from desires, obligations, and intentions, select
goals, generate plans, and execute them. To program the
agent’s deliberation process, these actions can be combined
in the deliberation language in different ways. At the level of
abstraction, goal generation and planning are both character-
ized as conflict resolution procedures.
BIO Normative Architecture. Governatori and Rotolo [62]
proposed a BIO architecture, which considers three compo-
nents (beliefs, intentions, and obligations). BIO follows the
BOID (belief, obligation, intention, and desire) architecture
to describe agents and agent types in defeasible logic. But
there are some peculiarities that make it different from
other frameworks such as BOID. Particularly, the system
develops a positive account of those modalities that match to
mental states and obligations. Rules are thus meant to devise
appropriate logical conditions for introducing modalities.
The development of social agents focuses on the components
of obligation and intention. The agents’ compliance could be
tested by directly focusing on plan design and execution [62].
Normative KGP Agents. Sadri et al. [45] presented a frame-
work that demonstrates how normative concepts, such as
obligation and prohibition, can be used by an agent while it
reasons, reacts, plans, and communicates in the context of
an artificial society. The framework builds upon an existing
framework called the KGP (knowledge, goals, and plans)
model of agency which they implemented in the prototype
agent platform PROSOCS. They develop agents that can
reason about norms that are expected to govern their own
behavior while pursuing their own goals.
OP-RNDNormative Framework. Ahmad et al. [46] developed
a normative agent framework called the obligation-prohi-
bition-recommended-neutrality-disliked (OP-RND) frame-
work to regulate rules and norms effectively. Their agents
perform tasks from a set of precompiled tasks based on
their beliefs of the reward and penalty associated with the
selected tasks. They define obligation, O, as a command
imposed by some agent in authority. In such environment,
an agent is obligated to perform an action and gets rewarded
for doing it or penalized for leaving it. Prohibition, P, is
defined as a command, in which the agent has to avoid an
action and hence gets rewarded for leaving it or penalized for
doing it. They consider obligation and prohibition (OP) as
rules imposed by the authority in a normative environment
due to absolute consequences (reward or penalty) upon
conformation or violation of some action [46].
3.2. Norms Representation in Agent-Based Systems. In nor-
mative systems, norms used in agent-based systems must
be presented in a manner that allows them to be processed
by software agents [7]. According to Savarimuthu [40],
researchers have represented norms in both explicit and
implicit data structures. Hollander and Wu [7] refer to four
major representation schemes that have been used in recent
research which are deontic logic, rule-based systems, binary
strings, and game theory [7].
(i) Deontic logic is developed from modal logic that is
an expanded version of classical formal logic which
deals with the “necessary” and “possible”. While,
deontic logic deals with obligations, prohibitions, and
permissions [63, 64].
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Figure 1: Norms classification architecture.
(ii) Rule-based systems are sets of condition/action pairs
coded with an inference engine. It is usually used
by systems that take benefit of offline design, where
the norms are represented implicitly into the agent’s
decision making system [8, 20, 48, 65–68].
(iii) Binary strings are orders of ones and zeros digits,
where the digit one represents the occurrence and
digit zero represents the absence of a norm. This
format is often used in research on population to test
the transmission and emergence of norms [69–73].
(iv) In game theory, every agent is able to make a simple
choice that yields a corresponding payoff and in every
round it tries to maximize their payoff by taking an
action based on what they expect their adversary to
take [7].
3.3. Open Normative Multiagent Communities. According to
Savarimuthu [40], an open normativemultiagent community
means that norms are not explicitly given to a visitor agent. In
other words, the agent is not conferred with the community’s
norms in offline mode. Instead, the agent must be able to
identify the norms by using some detection algorithm.
While this work concurs with the authors in this def-
inition, it proposes the idea that an open community also
refers to the agent’s free and unrestrictedmovement from one
community to another to achieve its goal. In such situation,
when the agent visits a new community and it does not have
any knowledge about the community’s norms, it should be
equipped with algorithms for detecting the norms.
3.4. Norms Enforcement in Normative Systems. To motivate
an agent to comply with the domain’s norms, the norms are
enforced by sanctions. According to Hollander and Wu [7],
enforcement is used during and after the spreading process
to create a motivation for agents to adopt a new set of norms
and ensure that agents keep obeying the acquired norms
[18]. Enforcement can be directed externally, internally, or
motivationally [4].
Normally, a third-party enforcement agent is given the
ability and authority to implement the sanctions [74]. In
addition, it avoids agent from norm violation by applying
sanctions [75]. But noncompliant norms could also trigger
emotions of shame or guilt in an agent even when a third
party enforcement is absent [76]. This fact is especially
efficient in large-scale communities, where it may be difficult
tomonitor compliance with equilibrium behavior that entails
sanctions by a third party [4].
3.5. Discussion. In this section we discuss three issues that we
consider as deficiencies in the norms literature.
(i) The first issue is that the literature classifies norms
into conventional and essential norms and reveals that there
are three types of norms which are constitutive, regulative,
and procedural norms. In our perspective, the three types
of norms are located under essential norm because these
types represent the definition of essential norms which is
solving collective action problems in case of conflict between
an individual and the collective interests by applying reward
or penalty. Figure 1 shows the norms classification based
on the literature. However, in this work we focus more on
regulative norms which directly affect agent behaviors [30].
Consequently, we only include regulative norms types in
Figure 1 and in the rest of this discussion.
With regard to the definition of regulative norms, the lit-
erature defines regulative norms to constitute the obligation,
prohibition, and permission norms, as follows.
(a) Obligation norm is the norm that may cause reward
or penalty; that is, if an agent exercises the norm,
it avoids the penalty, but if it does not do so, it is
penalized [46]. From the definition, we can infer the
case that when an agent acts on an event, it avoids a
penalty and when the agent does not act on an event,
it gets a penalty.
(b) Prohibition norm is the norm that may also cause
penalty but in a negated sense of obligation norms;
that is, if the agent does not exercise the norm, it
avoids the penalty, but if it does it, it is penalized [46].
Intuitively, from the definition, we can also infer the
case that when an agent acts on an event, it gets a
penalty and when the agent does not act on event, it
avoids a penalty.
(c) Permission norm is part of obligation norms but
it exempts agents from some of their obligatory
behavior under specific circumstances [77].
From the previous discussion, we conceive another case
of regulative norm that has not been deliberated in the
literature. This is the situation when an agent gets rewarded
for exercising a norm but is not penalized otherwise. Conse-
quently, we propose a new type of regulative norms, which
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Figure 3: The structure of norms’ influence.
we called the recommendation norms. We adapt the term
“recommendation” from the OP-RND framework by Ahmad
et al. [46]. In their work, they divide agent performance
into three mutually exclusive periods: recommended (R),
neutrality (N), and disliked (D). Recommended period in this
framework represents a period when an agent is rewarded if
it completes a task within this period but is not penalized oth-
erwise. In this work, we adapt the definition of recommended
norms to represent any actions or behaviors of agents that are
judged by the community as noble or altruistic, hence merit
for rewards. This is the type of norm that rewards an agent if
it is exercised by the agent but is not penalized otherwise.
A case for the recommendation type norm is that when
an agent acts on an event, it gets a reward and when the agent
does not act on an event, it gets no reward or penalty.
To clarify the idea of recommendation norms,we offer the
following example. Consider a scenario in a crowded elevator
and someone, S, wants to choose a floor but is unable to reach
the buttons, while another person, X, is standing just besides
the buttons. There are two situations:
(1) X offers to help S and presses for him/her the desired
floor button and S rewards X by thanking him/her;
(2) X does not offer to help S but S does not penalize X.
Figure 2 shows the modified norms classification archi-
tecture.
(ii) The second issue is the regulative norm types (i.e.,
recommendation, obligation, prohibition, and permission).
We argue that these types are influenced by reward and
penalty only and they are not applicable to domains that
are not applying reward and penalty. We claim that there
is another way to describe those norms’ domains based on
population adoption. Since the norms are enacted by the
majority of a population [7], we consider that there are
two types of norms which are potential norms and weak
norms. The potential norms are adopted by the majority of
the population, while the weak norms are adopted by the
minority.The norms can be influenced by reward and penalty
and by the majority and minority of population adoption.
Figure 3 shows the structure of the norms’ influence.
(iii) The third issue is the empirical work on norm life
cycle of which there are several [7, 38, 40]. We argue that
all of these works have missed to include norms assimilation
as a mechanism of norms enforcement and emergence. We
shall discuss this issue in Section 5 in detail and present our
perspective by modifying the existing work on norm’s life
cycle.
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Figure 4: Norms creation mechanisms.
4. Empirical Research
and Mechanisms on Norms
The next few sections present a comprehensive review of the
empirical studies in normative systems and their simulation
mechanisms and discuss the limitations of these studies. We
then review the models in the literature on norm’s life cycle.
4.1. NormsCreation. Theprocess of presenting a newnorm in
a normative system is called norm creation [7]. According to
Posner and Rasmusen [78], norm creation requires spreading
of the norm and developing sanctions for its violation. In
the real world, norms are created from three methods which
are, natural emergence from social interaction, decree by a
powerful agent, and agents negotiation within a group [20,
21, 38, 79].
Savarimuthu [40] claimed that there are three approaches
to create a norm in artificial intelligence agents: when the
norms are specified by a designer [48], when the norms are
specified by a leader [15, 49], and finally when the norms are
considered good for society by a norm entrepreneur [80].
However, Hollander and Wu [7] defined two approaches in
general which are offline design and autonomous innovation.
Savarimuthu [40] defined another approach, which is social
power. Figure 4 shows the mechanisms of norms creation.
4.1.1. Offline Design. In offline design, designers encode
norms directly in agents, which enact the norms. Any new
norms required by the system in future are updated by the
designers. This approach could be practically implemented
in simple systems, but, in complex reasoning systems, offline
design could fail in capturing the details required for realistic
performance [7]. Another limitation of this mechanism has
been specified by Savarimuthu [40] who objected to the
notion that offline design assumes that all agents adopt the
norms in a society which might not be realistic especially in
open communities, when different norms are competed to
present as the society’s norm.
An example on offline design is by Shoham and Tennen-
holtz [47] who tested traffic-associated norms [40]. Other
examples are by Walker and Wooldridge [51]; Conte and
Castelfranchi [48]; and Hales [68] who created experiments
based on the offline design approach. Conte and Castel-
franchi [48] simulated agents finding foods in a grid in which
agents are engaged in some basic rules for movements and
food collections. In this work, they assumed that the agents
are made up of strategic agents or normative agents. In this
simulation, the strength of an agent is increased when it
consumes food, while it is reduced when it moves from
one cell to another in the grid. From their simulation that
compares utilitarian and normative strategies, they discov-
ered that norms decrease the violence level and increase the
average strength of an agent.
4.1.2. Norms Autonomous Innovation. In this approach,
agents create new norms without any external interference.
For this to happen, the challenge of ideation must be
addressed. Ideation is how an idea of behavior becomes a
norm in the first place and filtering which ideas are accepted
and rejected [7, 17].
Current researches on norms creation based on inno-
vation (ideation and filtering) have focused on machine
learning and game theory [20, 81]. In game theory, ideation is
almost reduced to offline design and filtering is based on the
choice of the most successful behavior. Such situation holds
true for machine learning in which ideation is conceived via
search and filtering is also based on the selection of successful
behavior. In more advanced situation, Andrighetto et al.
[82] suggested an alternative approach based on cognitive
architecture for research on norms creation via simulation
which allows more exploration on norm innovation [7, 82,
83].
4.1.3. Social Power Mechanism (Leadership and Punishment).
Social power can also be an important notion in establishing
norms [84–86]. Lo´pez [87] noticed that an agent is able to
express its social powers via its ability to change the beliefs,
motivations, and goals of other agents. The sources of power
can either be leadership mechanism (encourages and moti-
vates followers to adopt a particular norm) or punishment
mechanism (enforces others to follow a particular norm)
[40]. Another approach by Boman [49], which is based on
centralized advisor, proposed that an agent is consulted with
a normative advisor before performing any action.
4.2. Norm Emergence. The term “emergence” is used to
describe norm creation and establishment on a microscale
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[7].The literature provided several definitions of norm emer-
gence. Finnemore and Sikkink [38] defined it as “persuasion
by norm entrepreneurs which try to convince a critical mass
of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms.” Another
definition byHollander andWu [7] described that the norm is
considered emergedwhen it has been adopted by an adequate
number of agents in a society. Savarimuthu [40] suggested
that when the norms have reached some significant threshold
in the degree of norm spreading, it indicates that the norms
are followed by a substantial proportion of agents in the
society.
Ample researches have been conducted in the area of
norm emergence [3, 11, 40, 88–92]. Hollander and Wu
[7] categorized the literature on norms emergence within
normative multiagent systems into three main areas. The
first area uses the game theory to describe the dynamics of
norm emergence. The second area investigates the relation-
ship between sanctions and norm emergence and the third
area attempts to realize the effect of transmission on norm
emergence.
Sen and Airiau [3] suggested a model of social norms
emergence by learning from interaction experiences. In their
model, each agent interacts repeatedly with other agents in
the society and every interaction is considered as a stage
game. The learning process in this model (which leads
to norm emergence) is that any agent in the game can
identify the policy of the game from repeated interactions
with multiple agents. They term this learning mode as
social learning from repeated interactions against players.
They investigated the effect of size of population, number
of actions, different learning strategies, nonlearning agents,
and the norms’ evolution speed and stability in multiple
relatively isolated populations. Their results show that when
the interaction probability is at least 0.3, only one norm
pervades the whole population and when the interaction
probability is 0.2, less divergent norms emerge.
Brooks et al. [90] proposed a theoretical approach to
study the dynamics of agents population playing a coordina-
tion game to specify the whole norms to which the society
can converge. They developed a prediction system of linear
repetition relations that shows (i) how frequently every norm
will be reached and (ii) the average time of convergence. The
study aimed to examine the norms emergence process and
predict the possible final norm that emerged. They validated
their prediction model for both constant and proportional
bias update schemes by using the empirical results from a
large number of simulations. They proved that a population
using one of these two update rules (constant and propor-
tional bias update) almost definitely converged on one of a
small set of norms.
Hollander andWu [92] described a model of group norm
emergence. In this model, they presented a simulation model
of multiagents built on top of the model of norms emer-
gence. Based on the simulation, they presented screening
experiments on the simulation that is aimed at observing
the significant factors that contribute to the emergence of
group norms and consensus formation. The experimental
results show that (i) the model can attain consensus as well
as two additional states of information equilibrium, (ii) both
network structure and agent behavior play an important role
in the formation of consensus, and (iii) the formation of
consensus is sensitive to the simulation parameter settings
and certain values can prevent its formation entirely.
4.3. Norm Enforcement. In agent communities, norms are
used to regulate agents’ behaviors but agents may decide not
to comply with the norms if this benefits them. Consequently,
norms enforcement is designed to offset these benefits and
thus the motives for not complying with the norms [75].
Social enforcements are often used to enforce an agent to
adopt the behavior of other agents [7]. Enforcement can
be performed externally, internally, or motivationally [4].
However, norms enforcement as defined by Savarimuthu [40]
is the process of discouraging the violators of the norms
via some form of negative sanction such as punishing and
encouraging the followers of the norms via some form of
positive sanction such as reward. These processes help to
sustain norms in a society.
To perform the enforcement, it requires a process that is
able to detect the activity of the norms and their probable
violations and handle this violation [93]. According to de
Pinninck et al. [75], norms enforcement can be achieved
through a controller via stopping forbidden actions or agent
controller via applying reward and penalty on agents. Figure 5
shows the types and mechanisms of norm enforcement.
4.3.1. Self-Enforcement. Self-enforcement is also called as
internally directed enforcement [7]. It occurs when an agent
punishes itself for violating a norm, which could happen
when an agent has internalized the norm and is influenced by
some emotion. According to von Scheve et al. [94] and Staller
and Petta [95], emotion is one of the critical and important
factors that drive self-enforcement [7].
In self-enforcement, the violator performs its own penalty
and this is often because its actions are not coordinated
with the actions of other agents. In other words, there is no
third party involved in its actions to apply punishment [78].
However, in case of self-enforcement, an agent is a victim of
a norm violation and is involved in the punishment without
prior information [75].
4.3.2.Third-Party Enforcement. The literature referred to this
type as externally directed enforcement [7]. A third-party
enforcement agent has the ability and authority to implement
the sanctions (reward or penalty) [74]. By applying sanctions,
it prevents an agent from directly involving in a norm
violation [75].
Third-party enforcement occurs when an agent observes
another agent violating a norm [11, 71, 73] or during norm
spreading when an agent does not adopt the norms of
others. As a result, the observing agent or an associated
authority applies sanction on noncompliant agent [7]. In
agent communities, externally imposed sanctions are often
used to constrain a deviant or undesirable behavior and
reduce the overall deviance or undesirable behaviors in the
population [69].
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Figure 5: Types and mechanisms of norms enforcement.
4.3.3. Mechanisms of Enforcement. In normative systems,
designing an enforcement mechanism is considered a very
important issue in agent communities where agents might
violate the expected behavior. These enforcement mecha-
nisms can be exploited to enforce agents towards compliance
with the norms and these mechanisms are usually monitored
to discover norm violations and trigger sanctions [96].
To enforce an agent to adopt or quit a certain norm, it
needs to provide mechanisms to motivate the agent to follow
or avoid the norm.Themechanism can be enforced internally
based on shame or guilt, motivationally based on reputation,
or externally based on sanction such as reward or penalty [7].
Several kinds of sanctions have been defined in the
literature, that is, sanctions based on emotion and reputation,
or can take some forms of relationship damage such as a
loss of trust or friendship [7, 13, 40, 75]. However, according
to Cardoso and Oliveira [98], there are two basic kinds of
sanctions, which are direct material sanction that has an
immediate effect (e.g., by applying fines) and indirect social
sanction, which may have an effect that extends over time,
that is, changing an agent’s reputation.
Direct Sanction. The coercive action against others to enforce
them to follow socially is known in the literature as a
sanction [7]. A sanction can be any form of punishment for
noncompliance with the associated norms or some form of
reward for compliant agents [7]. The sanction is applied by
either a neighboring agent who observes a deviant agent or by
some forms of authority structure that detects and sanctions
the violators [7]. The sanction is often associated with a cost
such as breakdown in relationship and loss or stop working in
some of utility value [7, 13].There are two common strategies
used when applying direct sanctions, which are deterrence
to discourage any future violations by punishing the violator
and retribution that intends to compensate the victim of the
violation [98].
Axelrod [99] used an enforcement mechanism called
metanorms that shows punishing agents who did not comply
with the norms and achieves norms equilibrium in the
society. The simulation of the metanorms mechanism also
shows that there is an increasing norm stability in every run
of the experiment. However, he discovered that when the
punishment associated cost is low for the punishers, the norm
can be sustained [40].
Va´zquez-Salceda et al. [100] studied the problem of
developing a mechanism for enforcing norms and they
proposed a sanction mechanism which provides services to
support police agents to enforce proper behavior. The police
agents are not able to observe the internal information and
process of the other agents, but they enforce the norms based
on the detection of public actions of violators. They apply
some forms of sanction (e.g., black lists, clock triggers, and
action alarms) to simplify norm enforcement on multiagent
communities [100].
Indirect Sanction. Indirect sanction can be influenced via
agent’s reputation or agent’s emotion, whose effects extend
through time. Two explicit sanctions are identified in a repu-
tation mechanism: a positive opinion towards an agent when
it complies with society norms or a negative opinion towards
the agent when it violates the society’s norms [40, 101]. The
concept of reputation has been widely used in several works
[101–106] but the term in the different approaches holds
different semantics. In other words, there is no unified view
about the meaning/semantics in the different approaches
[101].
According toGrizard et al. [101], some researchers assume
that each agent has only one reputation globally handled by
the system [107], while others consider that two agents can
possess a different view about the reputation of an agent [103,
105, 106]. Others think that reputation is related to the given
context [102] of the sources exploited to develop their target
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Figure 6: Internalization, adapted from Fix et al. [97].
nature [108]. However, Casare and Sichman [109] attempted
to present a unified view of all the mentioned aspects based
on functional ontology of reputation [101].
The work by Grizard et al. [101] suggested that there is no
globally maintained reputation value; therefore, two agents
can maintain different reputation values for the same target.
Thus, the values of reputations aremaintained by other agents
and are external to the sanctioned agent.
The value of an agent’s reputation decreases if the agent
violates the norm (negative sanction) or increases if the agent
conforms to the norms (positive sanction).They consider that
the sanctions based on changes in reputation are motivated
to respect the norms for the violating agents because one of
the costs for an agent in low reputation might be the refusal
of other agents to interact with it (social exclusion). They
formalize the sanction in terms of reputation as “sanction
(applier; sanctioned; weight)” where applier is the agent
who applies the sanction, sanctioned is the agent that is
sanctioned, and weight is the value of the sanction. The
weight parameter is used to affect the reputation value of an
agent according to a specific mechanism.
Emotions have also been used in normative systems
research to sustain social norms over time [95, 97] and von
Scheve et al. [94]. For example, people feel embarrassed if
they violate social norms (e.g., wearing jeans in a formal
dinner) [46, 95, 110].
Staller and Petta [95] presented an emotion mechanism
based on the work of Conte and Castelfranchi [48]. In their
work, they showed that the computational study of social
norms can benefit by modeling emotions among agents
in artificial communities. Consequently, they suggested the
TABASCO architecture for the development of appraisal-
based agents. Bazzan et al. [111] constructed a framework for
simulating agents with emotions, by employing a scenario
that regards social norms for agents. Furthermore, they used
theOCCmodel for the computationalmodel of cognitive and
behavioral features of emotions.
Fix et al. [97] present a Petri net-basedmodel of sanction-
ing noncomplying behavior by methods of social emotions.
In their scenario (as shown in Figure 6), there is a violator
(actor 1) and an observer/punisher (actor 2). Actor 2 observes
the behavior of actor 1 and attempts to discover a norm
violation. As soon as violation has been discovered, the emo-
tions of disdain, scorn, or revulsion are elicited (transition
“generates social emotions”) and their expression (transition
“expresses social emotions”) comprises the punishment of a
violator agent which lead to (place “sanctioning by way of
emotion expression”) the negative emotions in the violator
(transition “generates social emotions”) and induce states of
shame, guilt, or embarrassment.
4.4. Norms Detection. Norms detection is the process of
updating an agent’s norms based on discovering a society’s
potential norms through some detection mechanisms which
rely on observing or interacting with other agents to infer
the potential norms. According to Hollander and Wu [7];
Boella et al. [112]; Conte and Dignum [113], when researchers
attempt to build a normative multiagent system, norms
detection is one of the main challenges faced by the designer.
The literature provides other terms of norm detection such
as norms recognition, norms adaptation [7], and norm
identification [40].
Hollander and Wu [7] defined norm recognition as the
agent’s ability to observe or interact with a group of agents
and discover the right norms of the agents in that group.
In case of humans, they are often able to accomplish that
via conversation [114]. However, norm recognition is also
concerned about the ability to detect deviant agents within
a group [7]. Hollander and Wu [7] have also defined norms
adaptation as a process of adapting new norms in which
system’s norms change over time. According to Savarimuthu
[40], norm identification mechanism can be exploited when
the norms have not been explicitly created in the society. An
agent can identify the norms from its environment through
interactions with other agents.
Norm detection is inspired by the process of norm
learning [7, 40, 115] and norm cognition [40]. Several studies
have been made by researchers on norm learning based on
mechanisms of imitation [70, 87, 116]; social learning [3,
117–120] case-based reasoning [121]; and data mining [122–
124]. Others have worked on norm cognition [82, 123, 124].
Figure 7 depicts the norms detection mechanisms derived
from the literature.
4.4.1. Norm Learning. Norm learning is the ability of learning
from others and it is an active technique to complement
and support the learning of individuals. In particular, norm
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Figure 7: Norms detection approaches and mechanisms.
learning presents the basis for culture where norms are
spreading within society and pass down from one generation
to another [125]. As we have mentioned earlier, there are four
mechanisms of norm learning suggested by the literature.
Imitation Mechanism. Epstein [70] proposed an imitation
model based on adopting the behavior of a majority of pop-
ulation. The phenomenon of imitation has been described as
“when in Rome, do as the Romans do.” This model is based
on the local environment state and the amount of thinking of
agent regarding its behavior.
Lo`pez [87] justified the needs of learning mechanism
in normative system because agents make decisions based
not only on their motivations and own goals, but also on
their observation of the normative behavior of other agents.
The author proposed three strategies to influence agents
to comply with a norm of related actions of other agents.
The strategies are simple imitation, reasoned imitation, and
reciprocation.
Andrighetto et al. [116] presented a comparative study
between two models of learning that are validated by simula-
tions, which are learning-based imitation and learning-based
recognition. The simulation study attempted to compare
the normative agents’ behaviors provided with (i) a norm
recognition module, which they called norm recognizers
(NRs) and (ii) a social conformity population model, called
social conformers (SCs), whose behavior is specified by
imitation rule.
Social Learning. Social learning in agent society means that
each agent learns from repeated interactions with other
agents in a society [3]. The individual’s behavior is largely
influenced by the interaction with others, through social
learning [119]. Sen and Airiau [3] proposed a social learning
theory, in which every agent in the community learns simul-
taneously from repeated interactions with randomly selected
neighbors.The key to success of this method depends on how
an agent learns from other agents within the social network.
Bosse et al. [119] presented a dynamic agent-based
approach to simulate and formally analyze the process of
social learning of agents’ behaviors. The general mechanism
is based on behavior changes by influence of peers. The
approach involves the influence of three types of agents
groups which are peers, parents, and school.
Case-Based Reasoning. Campos et al. [121] used case-based
reasoning (CBR) as a learning technique to decide how to
adapt domain-level norms that depend on current system
status. CBR learning is based on heuristics that aligns the
amount of serving/receiving capacity, and this heuristic is
used by the CBR to suggest a solution when no similar cases
are found.
Data Mining. Few studies in norms detection emerged
from data mining applications. Data mining entails scouring
through data records in databases to identify significant
patterns that are useful for a decision-making process [126].
Among the data mining tasks such as classification or
clustering, association rule mining is one particular task that
extracts desirable information structures like correlations,
frequent patterns, associations and casualness between sets
of items in transaction databases or other stores of data
[126, 127]. Association rule mining is widely used in many
different fields like telecommunication networks, marketing,
risk management, inventory control, and others [126]. The
association rule mining algorithm discovers association rules
from a given database such that the rule satisfies a predefined
value of support and confidence. The aim of using support
and confidence thresholds is to ignore those rules that are not
desirable, because the database is huge and users care about
those frequently occurring patterns only [128].
Symeonidis andMitkas [122] presented an agent-oriented
algorithm that deals with agent actions, which is called
K-profile. K-profile is mainly used to predict an agent’s
behaviors by exploiting data mining techniques to extract the
knowledge from historical data and express the actions of
agents within the multiagent systems.
Savarimuthu et al. [123, 124] develop two algorithms;
the one to identify obligation norms is called Obligation
Norm Identification (ONI) [124] and the other to identify
the prohibition norm is called Candidate Norm Inference
(CNI) [123].These two algorithms are designed based on data
mining, specifically on the association rule mining approach.
4.4.2. NormCognition. In recent research on normdetection,
a new approach has been suggested by Andrighetto et al. [82],
which is norm cognition or cognitive approach. According
to Savarimuthu [40], the cognitive approach shows potential
because agents based on this approach have the normative
expectation notion. Specifically, cognitive approach focuses
onwhat happens inside an agent’smind to detect normswhen
they join new communities and deliberate about norms.
Agents based on this approach can propose a new norm that
relies on their past experience [40].
Andrighetto et al. [82] proposed a norm innovation
theory in coping with specific types of complex entities such
as a social system called the EMIL architecture. Two-way
dynamics are categorized by the theories which are emergent
processes consisting of emergence from interaction among
individual agents and emergent effects: emergence of entities
(norms) at the aggregate level into the agents’ minds.
Savarimuthu et al. [123, 124] emphasized the importance
of the cognitive approach and presented a cognitive model,
in which agents are located in a domain where other agents
entering the domain may not be aware of the protocol
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associated with domain’s norms. An agent located in the
domain is able to observe other agents’ actions and is able
to extract the society’s norms from these actions based on
the ability of recognizing negative and positive signals (e.g.,
reward and penalty) events by using a filtering algorithm.The
agent, after identifying the normative protocol of the society,
updates its personal belief base by adding or removing norms.
4.5. Norms Spreading. The process of distributing norms in
a society or social group is called norms spreading [40].
Hollander and Wu [7] defined norms spreading as “the
ability for norms to spread is a consequence of the system’s
underlying network topology in conjunction with active and
passive transmission mechanisms.” However, the spreading
mission is to transmit a norm from an agent to another [7].
There are several ways to spread norms and to cover that we
discuss the spreading process via twomain subjects which are
relationship structure and network topology. Figure 8 shows
the details.
4.5.1. Relationship Structure. According to Savarimuthu [40]
and Hollander and Wu [7], there are three ways by which a
social norm can spread between society members which are
vertical transmission, horizontal transmission, and oblique
transmission [17, 129].
Vertical Transmission. The case that describes the kind of
vertical transmission is the norm transmission from parents
to offspring [7, 40]. The spreading process based on vertical
transmission ensures that the offspring adopt some or all of
their parent’s norms; in other words, it generates offspring
that inherit parents’ behavior and thus ensures the transmis-
sion of norms from one generation to another [7, 40, 130].
According to Savarimuthu [40], one famous research in this
subject is by Axelrod [99] and other researchers who have
tested the vertical model for norm spreading [131, 132].
Horizontal Transmission. Another kind of spreading is hor-
izontal transmission [7], which occurs when the norms are
transmitted between peer interactions in the same generation
[133, 134]. The advantages of these laterally spreading norms
through a population are to enable agents to adopt newnorms
from their unrelated neighbors and to increase the variety of
an agent’s behaviors during its own lifetime [7].
Oblique Transmission.The last kind of norms spreading based
on relationship is oblique transmission and an example of
this kind is the transmission of the norms from a leader of
a society or social group to the followers [7, 40]. Oblique
transmission occurs when norms are broadcasted from an
authority body to a set of subordinates and this process
can spread the norms both vertically and horizontally. This
approach is used by centralized multiagent systems and
normative systems [7, 80].
Savarimuthu [40] suggested that vertical and oblique
transmissions can be considered as leadership mechanisms
that encourage the followers to acquire norms and horizontal
transmission can be considered as peer-to-peer mechanism
where agents learn from daily interactions with other peers.
4.5.2. Network Topology. Researches in network topology of
normativemultiagent systems aremainly related to the effects
of agent topology on the norms spreading or emergence [7].
In norms spreading, the social network between members in
real world is very important because people are not related
to each other randomly, but they are connected via the social
groups such as work groups, ethnic groups, and hobby groups
[40].
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In social systems [135], the network topology is essential
to study the different social phenomena based on networks
properties and characteristics. For example, Macy andWiller
[136] noticed the importance of network density and they
discovered that increasing network density increases the diffi-
culty of coordination. Borgatti and Foster [137] described the
homophily phenomenon which indicates people’s tendency
to interact with other similar people based on individual
characteristics such as shared beliefs [135].
There are two approaches of network topologies which
are static and dynamic (Figure 9). In case of static topologies,
the topology is fixed; in other words, the links are prespeci-
fied. For dynamic topologies, the fundamental network can
change and the links are determined endogenously based
on the mechanisms involved in the model [40, 138]. There
are several ways or structures for agents to be connected
with each other. The connecting models are a small-world
network, fully-connected or complete network, a random
network, and a scale-free network [40, 91, 135, 139].
Static and Dynamic Network Topology. According to Fan
and Ammar [140], when the required communication is
fixed through time, the ideal choice of network topology is
static, whereas when the required communication is chang-
ing through time, the ideal choice of network topology is
dynamic. However, the problem of static topological design
has been widely studied for native networks. The dynamic
topology design did not get the same attention because
through small time scales, the hard-wired native networks are
normally not reconfigurable [140].
In case of static network topology, agents interact between
them depending on their location in a circular lattice [40].
Several researches have been conducted on the static network
topology [3, 10, 40, 132, 141]. The work by Kittock [141]
was the first experimental study on the role of network
topology in emergence of convention [40]. Kittock [141]
noticed that the choice of global structure has a high impact
on the system evolution and this is based on the network
topology and the convention emergence varies. Specifically,
he supposed that the network diameter is directly related
to the convergence rate [40]. Shoham and Tennenholtz [88]
developed an algorithm called Highest Cumulative Reward
(HCR) algorithm that helps an agent to learn about choosing
the best interaction strategy within a social network.
Nakamaru and Levin [72] conducted several experiments
on the evolution of two norms by using four different types
of network topologies. The two norms are the background
of an agent against the opinions that the agent holds. The
background is a norm that is shared by the population but
agents in the population can hold different opinions about the
background norm. They note that (i) when people of similar
background meet, some of their opinions might change (ii)
and when two agents have similar opinions and different
backgrounds, they could change their background [40].
Few researches have been conducted on the dynamic
network topology [40, 142]. Griffiths and Luck [142] studied
the emergence of norms between agents in a network
topology, in which agents rewire their links with immediate
Figure 9: Network topology, adapted fromMacal and North [138].
neighbors by swapping their worst neighbors with the best
neighbors.
Savarimuthu [40] conducted experiments on the role
model mechanism for norm emergence that works on top
of dynamically evolving networks. In their simulation, the
set-up of experimental architecture for norm emergence
comprises the social network topology and the role model
mechanism and the networks are constructed based on the
mobile agent model of Gonzale´z et al. [143]. To perturb the
network, the links are changed (adding and removing links).
In another work, Fenner et al. [144] presented a social
network in stochastic model. The model represents the net-
work dynamic nature as it evolves through time. Agents may
join the network; existing actors may inactivate themselves
and reactivate at a later period. Actors manage new relations
based on a preferential attachment rule that weights different
agents according to their degree [139].
Connecting Models.There are different possible social ways of
connection between individuals in a society or social group.
As we have mentioned earlier, the most famous ways are a
fully connected or complete network, small-world network,
a random network, and a scale-free network [40, 91, 135, 139].
In fully connected or complete network of a specific society,
every agent is connected to all other agents in the society as
shown in Figure 10.
This case might be represented when an organization is
rather small and each one communicates regularly and works
closely with other agents. In such case, each agent influences
all other agents and relies on the rule of local influence,
and the agents attempt to reach the same values of belief
through time [135]. Savarimuthu [40] claimed that numerous
researchers have experimented this type of topology andmost
of these experiments include interactionswith all the society’s
agents [10, 49].
The second type of network topology (as shown in
Figure 11) is the small-world network [135], which hypothe-
sizes that each agent in the network is connected to all other
agents by only a few steps [145]. For example, in sociology,
based on observation on individuals’ relations, most people
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Figure 10: Fully-connected network, adapted from Ross et al. [135].
Figure 11: Small-world network, adapted from Ross et al. [135].
have many friends living nearby, but also they have a few
friends living far away [145]. A similar example by Ross et
al. [135] suggested that, within organizational society, people
might havemany friends in their department, while they have
a few friends in other departments.
The other type is a random network (as shown in
Figure 12), in which links are established randomly between
nodes based on some probability distribution which must be
less than 1 because if the probability equals 1, the network
becomes fully connected [40]. The probability of nodes
connecting in the work by Ross et al. [135] is based on
a binomial distribution, which means that the agent who
connects with other agents has no greater probability of being
connected to the two randomly selected agents within the
network. Erdo¨s and Renyi [146] studied the random graphs
properties and have presented random networks generating
mechanism [40].
Figure 12: Random network, adapted from Savarimuthu [40].
Figure 13: Scale-free network, adapted from Savarimuthu [40].
The last type of network topology is a scale-free network
(as shown in Figure 13). Nodes in such network are not
connected to each other randomly, whereas a few nodes are
well connected and are called hubs and other large number
of nodes connected to a few nodes only. It is called scale-
free because the ratio of well-connected nodes to the number
of nodes in the rest of the network remains constant as the
network changes in size [40].
According to Ross et al. [135], in scale-free network, the
distribution of nodes is based on law of power which means
that there are a few nodes that have a large connection (high
power) and relativelymany nodes that are sparsely connected
(low power). In this topology, the highly connected (high
power) nodes play a main role in carrying the other nodes
of the network close to each other [135]. Baraba´si and Albert
[147] presented a mechanism for generating a scale-free
topology based on their observations of large real-world
networks, that is, the Internet, social networks, and protein-
protein interaction networks [40, 148].
4.6. Norm Internalization. Internalization is the process in
which agents integrate information (new norms) into their
cognitive structure [7]. Conte et al. [149] defined norm
internalization as a mental process that acquires norms as
The Scientific World Journal 15
inputs and presents them to the internalizing agent’s new
goals as outputs. Once the norm has been adopted by agents,
social enforcements continue to enforce into internal desires
and motivations and ensure that agents continue complying
with the norm. Through time, the norms are incorporated
into the desires of agents and priority shifts from the
original norm possessed by agents to the newly acquired
norm (internalization) [7]. In general, internalization can be
considered as the measurement unit of compliance towards
the performance of new norms [150]. The steps that an agent
should perform to internalize a norm are as follows [7].
(1) Norm Acceptance. The norms to be internalized must be
accepted by an agent. Norm acceptance is the process of
conflict resolution where external enforcements on the agent
vie against its internal desire. This happens when there is a
conflict with existing norm or the associated cost of accepting
is too high that it is rejected [151]. However, as long as the
normcanbe removed, it is possible for the agent to experience
new norm conflict with the existing norm.
(2) Transcription.When an agent has accepted a norm, it then
must go through a transcription process. Transcription is the
process of adding new norm to the agent’s knowledge base.
(3) Reinforcement. After a norm has been accepted and
integrated with an agent, it then goes through reinforcement
process to ensure that the agent is obeying the norm. Failing
in obeying the norm subjects the agent to sanction that forces
it to reevaluate its behavior and adopt new norms.
Few researches have discussed norm internalization [15,
149, 152–154] and the subject becomes more popular after
the presentation by Andrighetto and Conte [152]. However,
most existing studies on normative systems consider a norm
as internalized as soon as it has been adopted [7].
Verhagen [15] used a simulationmodel tomeasure norms
internalization and spreading.The simulationmodel consists
of a group of agents with one of them acting as the leader.
The agents roam in a two-dimensional space. The measure-
ment method of norm internalization is by determining the
difference between an agent’s self-model and its groupmodel,
and if there is no difference, then the agent has internalized
the norms.
Andrighetto et al. [154] presented and implemented an
internalization module that has been integrated into EMIL-
A agent architecture [82, 83]. The implemented experiments
observed internalizer behavior (internalizer is the agent who
has internalized the norm) in communities with different
types of agents when a norm is salient and nonsalient. The
salient norm means providing information to people about
the behavior and beliefs of other individuals. Their results
show that a norm is salient EMIL-I-A (EMIL internalizer
agent) and goes through all the internalization stages and
when the norm is no more salient, it returns to its normative
behavior.
4.7. Norm Assimilation. Crudely put, norms assimilation is
the process of joining and abiding by the rules and norms of
a social group. Eguia [155] defined assimilation as the process
in which agents embrace new social norms, habits, and
customs, which is costly but offers greater opportunities. The
problems of norms assimilation are attributed by the ability
and capacity of an agent to assimilate in a heterogeneous
society, which entails a number of social groups that have
different normative protocols (in compliance and violation)
and the motivation required for the agent to assimilate with a
better-off group [155].
A literature search within the domain of norms and
normative systems does not seem to produce a substan-
tial number of research papers that discuss the empirical
approach to norm assimilation. The papers only discuss the
meaning of the word “assimilation” without building any
concrete concept about it [30, 116, 156]. However, the concept
of assimilation has been discussed in the domain of social
sciences deliberating on the assimilation cost between two
social groups concerning the difference in assimilation costs
between better-off and worse-off groups or betweenminority
and majority groups [155, 157, 158].
4.8. Norm Removal. Norm removal is the ability of removing
an obsolete norm and replacing it with a new norm which
occurs when there is a conflict between the domain’s new
norm and an internalized obsolete norm of an agent. The
removing process is theoretically important when the system
has been updated and becomes more complicated or it
is limited in resources [74]. However, there are no any
particular researches on the outcome of norm removal except
few processes that are often implicit in many systems that
implement norm modification [7].
4.9. Discussion. From the review and analysis of norm
processes and mechanisms, we notice several limitations and
gaps in the work of norms and normative systems.There is an
obvious gap in research in norm detection. Norm detection
is critical in overcoming the problem that occurs from its
absence in research, which is the offline design of norms
[5, 48, 51, 68]. In particular, the gap ismore obvious in the area
of norm detection based on the cognitive approach where
very few researches have been conducted in this area [40, 82].
The second limitation is the clear gap in norm assim-
ilation. There is no literature found in this area except
a few research work from social studies [155, 157, 158].
However, the works by social science researchers are neither
developed for the normative multiagent systems nor for the
evaluation process of norm’s life cycle in agent communities.
But the results of these research can be exploited to build an
assimilation approach that offer a useful contribution in the
domain of normative multiagent systems.
Other limitations are research gaps found in norm inter-
nalization and norm removal forwhich the literature does not
provide ample and significant research output.
5. The Evolution of Norm’s Life Cycle
There are ample researches on normative multiagent sys-
tems with considerable amount of structure, similarity, and
connectivity to manifest the fundamental organization of
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norms that enables researchers to create a process-oriented
model of norm’s life cycle [7]. In this section, we review the
literature on evolutionary process of norm’s life cycle, derive
the deficiencies of each model, and conclude the discussion
with a comprehensive norm’s life cycle.
5.1. Suggested Models of Norm’s Life Cycle in the Literature.
In the previous sections, we presented the various normative
processes andmechanisms that have been used by researchers
to build normative systems (e.g., norm creation, norm emer-
gence, etc.). This section reviews and presents the suggested
models on the evolution of norm’s life cycle as described in
the literature. Three main studies have been found in the
literature on norm’s life cycle. The first work is by Finnemore
and Sikkink [38] and the two latest works are by Savarimuthu
[40] and Hollander and Wu [7].
Finnemore and Sikkink [38] identified a three-staged
process of norm’s life-cycle.
(i) The first stage is norm emergence by persuading other
agents to follow the norm.
(ii) The second stage is norm cascade that includes
wide norm acceptance specified by imitation, which
attempts to socialize others to become followers.
(iii) The third stage is norm internalization when a norm
in a society is widely accepted and becomes a routine
task for the followers.
The first two stages are divided by a threshold point, at
which a critical mass of relevant actors adopt the norm. The
characteristic mechanism of norm emergence is conviction
by norm entrepreneurs which persuade a critical mass of
norm leaders to embrace new norms. Norm cascade is
characterized by imitation of the norm leaders and their
strong motivation but the norm that cascades through the
rest of the population may vary. Norm internalization is
characterized by the adoption of a norm by the majority and
it is no longer a matter of broad public debate. However,
completion of the life cycle is not a certain process because
many of norms emergent fail to reach a threshold point [38].
Savarimuthu and Cranefield [20] identified four main
phases of norm’s life cycle which are norm creation,
norm spreading, norm enforcement, and norm emergence.
For each specific phase, some simulation mechanisms are
assigned. However, Savarimuthu [40] updated the phases
and their simulation mechanisms to become five phases as
follows:
(i) norms creation, in which multiagent systems’ norms
are created by one of the three mechanisms which are
offline design, leadership, and entrepreneurship;
(ii) norms identification, which is active when the norms
have not been explicitly created and agents need a
mechanism to identify the norms based on interac-
tions with other agents, and two mechanisms have
been suggested to identify norms which are learning
and cognition: learning can be achieved via imitation,
machine learning, and data mining;
(iii) norms spreading is concerned with norms distri-
bution within a social group; several mechanisms
can help in norms spreading such as leadership and
cultural evolution;
(iv) norms enforcement is the process that discouraged
violating norms or encouraged the practice of norms
by society members via some forms such as sanction,
reputation, and emotion;
(v) norms emergence is a process in which a norm has
been adopted by a substantial proportion of a society
and is recognized by the majority.
Another work by Hollander and Wu [7, 92] identified
several normative processes of norm life cycle which are cre-
ation, transmission, recognition, enforcement, acceptance,
modification, internalization, emergence, and forgetting.The
three main processes are called superprocesses which are
enforcement, internalization, and emergence.
In this work, the norm evolution proceeds as follows.
(i) Norms are primarily created from ideas.
(ii) New norms are then spread via active or passive
transmission.
(iii) Agents’ neighbors are exposed to the new norms. In
this stage, social enforcement is required to ensure
that those norms are adopted and internalized.
(iv) Internalizationmeans the newnorms are shifted from
agents’ original preferences to the newly acquired
norms.
(v) This chain of transmission, enforcement, and inter-
nalization is known as normative emergence.
(vi) The norm disappears and becomes invalid when
existing norms are no longer suitable to the current
conditions. They are candidates to be removed and
new norms are created via an evolutionary process.
5.2. Discussion. Having presented the available research in
the literature on evolutionary process of norm’s life cycle, this
section discusses the gap in each model and concludes the
discussion with another novel norm process that fills the gaps
in the existing norm’s life cycle.
The model by Finnemore and Sikkink [38] begins from
norm emergence while other researches on norm’s life cycle
start with norm creation followed by norm emergence [7, 40].
Another issue is that norm enforcement has not been clearly
presented in the proposedmodel. In addition, other processes
such as norms detection and norms assimilation have not
been mentioned or defined.
The model by Savarimuthu [40] does not include three
processes which are norm internalization, norm assimilation,
and norm removal. Norm internalization is a very important
process that is required for an agent to embrace a new norm
[7, 38]. Norm assimilation completes the process of norm
detection or identification that he suggested in his work. It
is futile for an agent which has identified a norm but has no
mechanism to assimilate with a social group or society [155].
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Figure 14: A proposed norm’s life cycle model.
Finally, norm removal is also an important process to start a
new cycle of evolution [7].
We concur with the model proposed by Hollander and
Wu [7, 92], although their work has not discussed norms
assimilation. In the next section, we attempt to develop a
model that includes the processes that are missed in the
literature such as norms assimilation.
5.3. A Proposed Norm’s Life Cycle Model. Our proposed
model in this section is inspired by the existing models in
the literature [7, 38, 40, 92]. In the proposed model, we
consider new processes such as norm assimilation, norm
detection, and norm adoption. We also offer a new structure
that we believe to be closer to reality. However, the main
processes of the proposed model are norm creation, norm
emergence, norm assimilation, norm internalization, and
norm removal. Norm emergence entails several processes,
which are called emergence operation. Emergence operation
comprises norm enforcement and norm adoption, while
norm adoption includes norm detection and norm spreading
processes.
As shown in Figure 14, the cycle begins from the norm
creation process as the first stage of the life cycle. The
second stage is normemergence that is accomplished through
another operation, which we called the emergence operation.
The emergence operation starts by enforcing the norms
via some enforcement mechanisms. During enforcement,
agents adopt this norm through the processes of detection or
spreading. They then assimilate the new norm within their
social group. Finally, when the agents have assimilated the
norm, they proceed with the norm internalization process
to establish the norm. The life cycle ends when the norm is
no more valid for some reasons and is removed and replaced
with a new norm.
Consequently, we set out each process and its available
mechanisms that have been discussed in Section 4. The
structure is categorized according to our proposed model as
shown in Figure 15.
(i) Norm creation: the mechanisms that are associated
with this process are offline design, normautonomous
innovation, and social power.
(ii) Norm emergence: it can be accomplished via the
emergence operation which entails the following
processes and mechanisms:
(a) Norm enforcement: the mechanisms that are
associated with this process are direct sanc-
tion and indirect sanction. Direct sanction is
represented by a sanction (reward or penalty).
Indirect sanction is represented by reputation or
emotion.
(b) Norm adoption: it can be achieved through two
processes, norm spreading and norm detection
as follows:
(1) norm spreading has three mechanisms
based on relationship which are verti-
cal transmission (e.g., from parents to
offspring), horizontal transmission (e.g.,
peers interactions), and oblique transmis-
sion (e.g., from leader to followers),
(2) norm detection which is inspired by norm
learning and norm cognitive approaches.
Four mechanisms of norm learning have
been defined by researchers, which are
imitation, social learning, case-based rea-
soning, and data mining.
The implementation of norm emergence is
based on network topology.
(c) Network topology: it is divided into static and
dynamic topologies and entails four models of
connection which are fully connected network,
small-world network, random network, and
scale-free network.
(iii) Norm assimilation: having new norms detected by
agents, they then calculate the assimilation cost and
accordingly decide whether to assimilate or decline.
(iv) Norm internalization: in this process, agents integrate
the new assimilated norms into their cognitive struc-
ture.
(v) Norm removal: norms which are considered obsolete
by a social group or society are removed from society
members’ cognitive structure.
6. Suggested Future Work
The scope for research in norms and normative multiagent
systems paves the way for many exciting new discoveries that
could be integrated in physical agents or robots. We outline
here some interesting areas that could be investigated in our
future work.
Norm’s Context Awareness. From our review of the literature,
we discover that agents are not aware of the context of
the enacted norms. Consequently, it would be interesting to
look into semantic agents that can deal with ontology-based
contexts. When agents could understand the meaning of
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Figure 15: The proposed model with mechanisms.
the norms, they would have greater reasoning ability about
the norms’ effects on their performance.
Formulating Norms Detection Based on Emotion. The liter-
ature assumed that detection techniques exploit an agent’s
emotion to trigger its belief on conforming with the majority.
Thus, if it does not conform, it feels guilty and detects the
norms. However, emotion is represented based on imitation
although emotion can be based on context too. Emotions
that are based on imitation only trigger beliefs to adapt the
majority norms, while when they are based on context, they
trigger agents’ beliefs to adapt the norms of minority or
majority of agents.
Formulating Norms Assimilation. The work on norms assimi-
lation is almost nonexistent in normative multiagent systems
although it has been theoretically discussed by social science
researchers. The goal of norms assimilation can be achieved
based on the social theory of assimilation that have been
deliberated in the literature, in which the decision to assimi-
late is influenced by two main elements which are the cost of
assimilation and the ability of agents.
FormulatingNorms Removal. Norms removal is considered as
one of the main processes of normative multiagent systems.
It describes the situation of a norm’s disappearance due to
cessation of practice. From our review of the literature, we
have not found any formal work in this area.
7. Conclusion
This paper reviews the study of normativemultiagent systems
from two disciplines, which are software agent technology
and social norms. Our review shows that agent systems have
been established as one of the technologies of thismillennium
and that multiagent systems are built with several disciplines
such as information technology, economics, logic, ecology,
biology, philosophy, and sociology.
The review on social norms reveals two categories of
norms which are conventional norms and essential norms.
In essential norms, there are obligation, prohibition, and
permission norms. Upon deliberating these types (obliga-
tion, prohibition, and permission norms), we discover and
propose a new norm type that we term as recommendation
norms. We discover that they are influenced by reward only,
while the other types are influenced by reward and penalty.
In norm life cycle, the literature shows that there are three
proposed life cycles. However, these researchers emphasized
on four main components which are creation, emergence,
enforcement, internalization, and learning.
In normative multiagent systems, we introduce the con-
cept, definition, usage, and the origin of normativemultiagent
systems. Normative multiagent systems have been studied
traditionally by researchers of moral and legal philosophy.
The literature reveals ample research that have been con-
ducted on norms architecture such as BOID, BIO, KGP, and
OP-RND.
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In issues related to normative systems, we discuss norms
representation and norms enforcement formats in agent-
based system. In norms representation, we notice that there
are several kinds of representation such as deontic logic, rule-
based systems, binary strings, game theory, decision trees,
and temporal logic. In norms enforcement, the norms can
be enforced by applying sanctions on violation.This sanction
is applied by a third-party enforcement. However, the norms
could also be triggered by emotions of shame or guilt in an
agent even when the third-party enforcement is absent.
We also review and present the various empirical studies
on normative systems and their simulation mechanisms and
identify the limitations of these studies. We then review and
discuss the limitations of the availablemodels in the literature
on norm’s life cycle. We exploit those models in developing
our own model of norm’s life cycle.
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